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NOTES AND COMMENTS
munication is the agent of the sender to carry information,'8 but
adherence to the doctrine under discussion would make it the compulsory agent of the sendee without his knowledge or consent.

W. T.

COVINGTON, JR.

Contracts-Consideration-Promise Not to Assign Note
and to Keep Matter Secret
In a recent North Carolina case' the widow of an insolvent defaulter signed a note not under seal to the amount of the defalcation
payable to the firm from which her husband had embezzled. Her
only assets at the time of the signing were moneys derived from a
life insurance policy belonging to her husband, of which she was
beneficiary. It was agreed that the note should be held without publicity of any kind and not turned over to any bank. In an action to
enforce collection of the note it was held that there was no consideration to support her promise to pay. The promise to observe silence
and not to assign was called "sentimental rather than valuable."
It is generally held that a note given by a widow in payment of
a debt owed by her husband, who was insolvent at the time of his
death, is void without a new consideration to support it.2 Nor does
the surrender of the old note provide such consideration. 8 Where
the estate is solvent a different result -obtains.4 Moral obligation
arising out of kinship does not ordinarily afford consideration to
support a promise to pay another's debt. 5 This doctrine appears to
"Glynn v. Hyde-Murphy Co., supra note 8.
1 People's Building and Loan Association v. Swaim, 198 N. C. 14, 150 S. E.

668 (1929).
'Paxon v. Niels, 137 Pa. 385, 20 Atl. 1016 (1891) ; Sykes v. Moore, 115
Miss. 508, 76 So. 538 (1917) ; Bank v. Hunter, 243 Mich. 516, 220 N. W. 665
(1928) ; Ferrell v. Scott, 2 Speers, 344, 42 Am3 Dec. 371 (S. C., 1844) ; Gilbert
v. Brown, 29 Ky. L. R. 1248, 97 S. W. 40 (1906) ; Cf. Shroeder v. Fink, 60 Md.
436 (1883): Contra: Nowlin v. Weson, 93 Ala. 509, 8 So. 800 (1891); Cf.
Wilton v. Eaton, 127 Mass. 174 (1880) ; Rathfon v. Loacher, 215 Pa. 571, 64
Adt. 790 (1906).
'Paxon v. Niels, supra note 2.
'Steep v. Harpham, 241 Mich. 652, 217 N. W. 787 (1928) ; Cawthorpe v.
Clark, 173 Mich. 267, 138 N. W. 1075 (1912). But cf. Rosenberg v. Ford, 85
Cal. 612, 24 Pac. 779 (1890) ; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 99 Cal. 193, 33 Pac. 862
(1893).
'Mortimore v. Wright, 6 Mees. & W. 482, 151 Eng. Rep. 502 (Ex. 1840);
Wiggins v. Keizer, 6 Ind. 252 (1855); Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29, 79 Am. Dec.
453 (1861) ; Beauchamp v. Beauchamp, 198 Ky. 167, 248 S. W. 502 (1923). See,
for a comprehensive discussion of this problem, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.)"437, and
cases there cited.
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be strictly enforced where the heirs of an insolvent debtor promise

to indemnify his creditors. 6
Seemingly there is in the instant case more than moral obligation
as consideration to support the promise. The fact that the promisee
obligated himself not to assign the note and to observe silence with
regard to the defalcation, would seem to satisfy the technical and

venerable requirement of a detriment to the promisee 7 as a surrender
of a valuable privilege.

Where the parties are equally capable of self-protection, the
adequacy of consideration will not be examined.8

But where the

enforcement of a contract would work a manifest injustice, and
where enforcement is wholly dependent upon a completely technical
consideration, courts have frequently seen fit to ignore such a cnnsideration. 9
In the instant case the ratio decedendi, prooably based upon the

constitutional provision for the protection of life insurance in the
hands of widows,' 0 seems to have brought about an eminently just

result.
T.

J. GoLD,

JR.

'XMcJelven
v. Stone, 56 Ga. 208 (1876) (holding that moral obligation was.
not sufficient consideration for a son's promise to pay his bankrupt father's
debts, under a section of the Georgia Code declaring good consideration to be"
such as is founded on natural duty and affection) ; Parker v. Carter, 4 Munf.
273, 6 Am. Dec. 513 (Va. 1814) ; Beauchamp v. Beauchamp, supra note 5.
WILLISTON on CoNTRAcTs, (1924) §113;'Riddle v. Hudson, 68 Okl. 172, 172
Pac. 921 (1919). Notes given for the purpose of procuring abandonment of
criminal proceeding are void, McMahon v. Smith, 47 Conn. 221, 36 Am. R. 67
(1882). But cf. Switzer v. Am,. R. R. Exp. Co., 133 S. E. 98 (S. C. 1926). It
is submitted in the instant case that the objection that the note is void on
grounds of public policy could not arise, the criminal action dying with the
embezzler.
'Fairchild v. Cartwright, 39 Cal. App. 118, 178 Pac. 333 (1918) ; Meyer v.
Nelson, 69 Colo. 56, 168 Pac. 1175 (1917); Yaryan Rosin & Turp. Co. v..
Haskins, 29 Ga. App. 753, 116 S. E. 913 (1923) ; Nolan v. Young, 220 S. W.
154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
' Luing v. Peterson, 143 Minn. 6, 172 N. W. 692 (1919) ; Cotton v. Graham,
84 Ky. 672, 2 S. W. 647 (1887) ; Grimes v. Grimes, 28 Ky. L. R. 549, 89 S. W.
548 (1905), holding that where deceased's estate was hopelessly insolvent, his
widow's promise to pay an outstanding debt against the estate was without
consideration, although a creditor, in reliance thereon destroyed a note given
him by the deceased; White v. Bluett 2 C. L. R. 301, 23 L. J. Ex. 36 2 W. R.
75 (1853) (forbearance on part of son to make complaints to father held no
consideration, "By the argument a principle is pressed to an absurdity, as a
bubble is blown until it bursts").
" N. C. Const. Art. 10, §7.

